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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on enforcement issues with regard to deepsea mineral mining in terms of unilateral and multilateral
structures. It begins by exploring early forays into mineral
mining, namely in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the
necessity of the extractives industries generally. Next, this
comment analyzes unilateral policy regimes, specifically through
the lens of United States courts and through differing mining
regulatory regimes between countries, and how unilateral
regulatory change is likely an ineffective mechanism for enforcing
standards for the industry. Finally, this comment looks at
international structures that currently govern deep-sea mineral
mining and how multilateral regulatory regimes may provide an
effective enforcement mechanism in the future. This comment
addresses, among other things, (1) the origins of deep-sea mineral
mining regulation under the International Seabed Authority; (2)
domestic regulation of deep-sea mineral mining; (3) the
environmental concerns associated with deep-sea mining; (4) how
unilateral changes to regulatory regimes may create externalities
that undermine enforcement efforts; and (5) dynamics of
international norms and its effects on deep-sea mineral mining.
It also explores potential solutions for industry regulations
and how to systematize such regulations. It concludes that while
the impacts of deep-sea mining are not thoroughly understood,
there exist both domestic and international solutions to account
for future unknown risk and possible incentive structures that can
effectively direct countries toward compliance with international
norms. Though this comment takes the position that unilateral
policy efforts with regard to deep-sea mineral mining seem
unlikely to be effective, it nonetheless recommends that the United
States pass new legislation raising liability limits for deep-sea
mining organizations similar in manner to the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990. This comment further recommends that any international
law-based changes include creating new international
agreements, or amendments to existing agreements, to emplace
incentive structures necessary for compelling compliance with
international norms, which would grant the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) adjudicative authority
and the World Trade Organization (WTO) the authority to provide
specific, enforceable trade-based remedies for deep-sea mineral
mining infractions.
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INTRODUCTION

If you cant grow it, you gotta mine it.1 This statement succinctly
and effectively describes the ultimate reality of what humanity requires for
sustainment and advancement. This quote does not, however, raise more
fundamental questions. If we must mine it, should we? And if we should,
under what conditions? Some of the most important commodities
necessary for modern life come in the form of minerals located both on
land and in the deep ocean.2 Our experience with land-based mining
regulations show that sole reliance on domestic regulations, absent strong,
international incentive structures and regulatory mechanisms, are
insufficient to effectively manage the industry.
The extractive industries provide the raw materials we use in everyday devices like computers and cell phones.3 Cobalt, nickel, and copper
are the necessary ingredients for lithium-ion batteries, which are the
commercial-ready solution for large scale energy storage.4 Most
importantly, these minerals are the raw materials that will provide the final
link in the chain for actioning the sustainable energy movement and
enabling a mass transition away from fossil fuels.5 This transition comes,
however, with all the implications that large-scale extraction bring.6
The largest source of minerals necessary for lithium-ion batteries is
currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo.7 Yet, as our demand for
energy storage grows, the economic viability of new sources of minerals,
1. Mary Beth Gallagher, Understanding the Impact of Deep-Sea Mining, MIT DEPT
4, 2019), http://meche.mit.edu/news-media/understanding-impactdeep-sea-mining [https://perma.cc/36NW-YQ3Z].
2. A World of Minerals in Your Mobile Device, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Sept. 2016),
https://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/0167/gip167.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8YJ-AZTD].
3. Id.
4. Gallagher, supra note 1.
5. Gallagher, supra note 1. See generally KRISTEN HUND ET AL., MINERALS FOR
CLIMATE ACTION: THE MINERAL INTENSITY OF THE CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITION (World
Bank Group 2020), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/961711588875536384/Minerals-forClimate-Action-The-Mineral-Intensity-of-the-Clean-Energy-Transition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S7Y7-SV47].
6. KRISTEN HUND ET AL., supra note 5. Extractive industries represent approximately
2-11 percent of total global energy consumption. Increasing demand for minerals does not
necessarily mean an increase in fossil fuel consumption for mining activities, however.
Those industries have the opportunity to utilize sustainable energy solutions for expanded
operations in the future. A holistic approach to the total carbon cost of sustainable energy
solutions, which includes the impact of mineral mining necessary to build such
technologies, provides a better estimate for the total impact these efforts will have. Id. at
17.
7. Gallagher, supra note 1.
OF MECH. ENGG (Dec.
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namely the deep ocean, will become increasingly attractive.8 With an
estimated $16 trillion worth of minerals in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone
(CCZ) alone, an area located between Hawaii and the west coast of
Mexico, it is no wonder why the deep ocean is considered a solution for
satisfying future mineral demands.9
On December 10th, 1982, 157 signatory nations created the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in addition to the
International Seabed Authority (ISA) and the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to manage the new agreement.10 The ISA in
turn created the Mining Code, drove research efforts to understand what
the impacts of deep-sea mining will be, and how best to manage extraction
efforts in the commons.11
To date, the ISA has issued thirty-one exploratory permits for deepsea mineral mining to twenty-two different countries or corporations.12
The countries represented are primarily wealthier nations like Russia,
China, Japan, France, and Germany, but there is also substantial
representation from island nations like Nauru, Tonga, the Cook Islands,
and Kiribati.13 The majority of these permits are for exploration in the
CCZ.14 Smaller nations, like Papua New Guinea, have sought to pursue
deep-sea mining projects through joint ventures,15 while corporations from

8. Gallagher, supra note 1.
9. Why the U.S. is Missing Out on the Race to Mine Trillions of Dollars Worth of
Metals from the Ocean Floor, 60 MINUTES (Nov. 17 2019), https://www.cbs
news.com/news/rare-earth-elements-u-s-on-sidelines-in-race-for-metals-sitting-on-oceanfloor-60-minutes-60-minutes-2019-11-17/ [https://perma.cc/U8C7-XAQR].
10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
11. The Mining Code, INTL SEABED AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code
[https://perma.cc/FY9T-7YQV] (last visited Oct. 4, 2021). The ISA has adopted a mining
code for exploration, but with regard to exploitation the code is still under development.
Id.
12. Michael Lodge, The International Seabed Authority and Deep Seabed Mining, U.N.
CHRONICLE, https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/international-seabed-authority-anddeep-seabed-mining [https://perma.cc/B8EA-X6WL] (last visited Oct. 4, 2021);
Exploration Contracts, INTL SEABED AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/exploration-contracts
[https://perma.cc/2ECH-6GDH] (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
13. Exploration Contracts, INTL SEABED AUTH., supra note 12.
14. Id.
15. Colin Filer et al., How PNG Lost $120 Million and the Future of Deep-Sea Mining,
DEV. POLY CENTRE BLOG (Apr. 28, 2020), https://devpolicy.org/how-png-lost-us120million-and-the-future-of-deep-sea-mining-20200428/ [https://perma.cc/W38M-N7QQ].
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larger countries either operate independently or under the auspices of
government-related structures in their home countries.16
As the mining industry races to develop extractive technology to
commercialize deep-sea mineral mining, the scientific community also
works to understand what the totality of the impact might look like.17
Despite attempts at deep-sea extraction in places like Papua New Guinea,
larger scale projects in the CCZ do not appear actionable in the near
future.18 The general concern in the scientific community is that deep-sea
mineral mining will begin at scale before researchers are able to fully
understand what the impact of these efforts will be.19 Indeed, as we have
observed with land-based mining, environmental effects are only one of
the externalities created by extractive industries, while other second order
effects may become apparent later on.20
In terms of the human impact on the deep ocean, it may very well be
impossible to reduce the level of uncertainty to zero. Current domestic and
international regulations, however, do not effectively account for our
current understanding, or lack of understanding.21 Further, previous and
ongoing experiences with externalities created by land-based mineral
extraction should provide even more warning against swift,
underinformed commercialization.22 The implications of delaying deepsea mineral mining efforts may, at worst, require prolonged reliance on
fossil fuels and a greater focus on carbon recapture efforts, but it will come
16. Wang Yan, Chinas Deep-Sea Mining, a View from the Top, CHINA DIALOGUE
OCEAN (Oct. 18, 2019), https://chinadialogueocean.net/10891-china-deep-sea-explorationcomra/ [https://perma.cc/8E8F-3QKN]. Chinese corporations seek exploratory permits
from the ISA, but these corporations operate under the auspices of the China Ocean Mineral
Resources Research and Development Association (COMRA), which provides
government oversight and support for mining activities. Id.
17. Laura Kaikkonen et al., Assessing the Impacts of Seabed Mineral Extraction in the
Deep Sea and Coastal Marine Environments: Current Methods and Recommendations for
Environmental Risk Assessment, 135 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 1183, 1184 (2018).
18. John Childs, Greening the Blue? Corporate Strategies for Legitimizing Deep Sea
Mining, 74 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1, 1 (2019); Gallagher, supra note 1.
19. Gallagher, supra note 1.
20. Kaikkonen, supra note 17, at 1193.
21. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1472 (2021) (the United States Code includes
environmental impact assessments as part of the domestic licensing process); The Mining
Code, INTL SEABED AUTH., supra note 11 (procedures for approving environmental impact
assessments include publication on the ISA website and the ability of signatory nations to
recommend changes).
22. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTL, THIS IS WHAT WE DIE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO POWER THE GLOBAL TRADE IN COBALT 16
(2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR6231832016ENG
LISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/6F5A-Z9QV].
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with an increased certainty that mineral mining in the future will produce
predictable, manageable externalities.23 This paper assumes a certain level
of inevitability with regard to deep-sea mineral mining commercialization
and, without recommending a prohibition on such practices in exchange
for environmental protections, proposes both (1) amendments to domestic
regulatory regimes; and (2) new or amended international agreements to
manage the industry in the future.
Though a piece of the solution includes changes to domestic
regulatory regimes, international solutions are necessary to ensure an
actionable enforcement mechanism exists. Using the United States as an
example, domestic regulatory regimes are problematic because (1) there
currently does not exist a robust structure for a future hypothetical plaintiff
to recover from an injury received as a result of deep-sea mineral mining;
24
(2) differences in domestic regulatory regimes may only serve to
encourage mining companies to operate out of countries with more lax
regimes, thus spurring a regulatory race to the bottom; and (3) domestic
solutions aimed at regulating other countries has historically been
ineffective in the mineral mining industry. To ensure actionable, uniform
enforcement of deep-sea mineral mining regulations under the ISA,
countries should either amend UNCLOS to make adverse ITLOS
23. See HUND ET AL., supra note 5.
24. See 30 U.S.C. § 1419(2)(e) (2021) (For the purposes of this chapter, any vessel or
other floating craft engaged in commercial recovery or exploration shall not be deemed to
be a vessel or other floating craft under section 502(12)(B) of the Clean Water Act and
any discharge of a pollutant from such vessel or other floating craft shall be subject to the
Clean Water Act.). The Clean Water Act allows for private rights of action against those
in violation of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2021). The Sixth Circuit has held that the Clean
Water Act does not give plaintiffs an implied right of action to enforce contractual
obligations of actors with the Environmental Protection Agency. See Board of Trustees of
Painesville Twp. v. City of Painesville, 200 F.3d 396, 400-401 (6th Cir. 1999). However,
the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act provides for a private right of action, giving
jurisdiction to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 30 U.S.C. §
1427 (2021). It is possible that a court may construe a deep-sea mineral mining license as
a contract with the Environmental Protection Agency, which may reduce a private actors
ability to recover under the Clean Water Act. It is also possible that though the Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act declares vessels and floating craft to not be considered
vessels for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, it is not clear that the Act would
extinguish a defendants ability to remove such a case to admiralty court. The lack of clarity
with regard to a private actors ability to recover from an injury received from deep-sea
mineral mining activities, thus, calls for a clearer regulatory scheme that makes such rights.
For example, the Oil Pollution Act provides a blueprint for how liability limits may be
raised for private rights of action in the deep-sea mineral mining context by specifically
identifying raised liability limits based off of specific offenses of a defendant. Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2720 (1990).
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decisions redeemable by complainants at the WTO for determination of an
effective trade-related remedy, or create a new international agreement
under the WTO similar in structure to the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
This comment first looks at the importance that certain minerals play
and their current global usage, concluding that the vast deposits in the deep
ocean will be a future source of minerals. Second, this comment analyzes
redressability in United States courts given the environmental concerns
associated with deep-sea mineral mining in addition to domestic
regulatory regimes that may be insufficient for regulating the industry.
Lastly, this comment analyzes the international structures governing deepsea mineral mining and how they can be changed to create reliable
enforcement mechanisms to ensure the future of the industry.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR MINERAL MINING AND THE FUTURE OF
DEEP-SEA MINERAL MINING
A. Why Deep-Sea Mineral Mining is Both Critical to Progress and
Reasonably Inevitable
According to the United States Geological Surveys (USGS) Mineral
Commodity Report in 2020, China was the worlds leading consumer of
cobalt, with more than 80% of its consumption being used by the
rechargeable battery industry.25 That report concluded that known landbased cobalt deposits totaled around seven million tons, while deep-sea
nodules on the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Ocean floors totaled more than
120 million tons.26 Lithium-ion batteries traditionally contain lithium
cobalt oxide and graphite.27 These energy storage systems are widely used
from cell phones and computers, to electric vehicles.28 In short, mining and
refining cobalt makes possible much of the advanced technology we
currently use and seek to use in the future.
A recent World Bank report estimates that global production of
graphite, lithium, and cobalt could increase by nearly 500% by 2050 to

25. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 51 (2020),
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7CC-VSD5].
26. Id.
27. What is a Lithium-Ion Battery and How Does it Work?, UNIV. OF WASH. CLEAN
ENERGY INST., https://www.cei.washington.edu/education/science-of-solar/battery-tech
nology/ [https://perma.cc/XV3M-PFAE] (last visited Sept. 30, 2021).
28. Id.
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meet the growing demand for clean energy technologies.29 Specifically,
the report predicts that by 2050 (1) annual demand for cobalt will increase
by about 450% or about 750,000 tons annually; (2) demand for nickel will
increase about 100% or about 2.2 million tons annually; and (3) annual
demand for copper will remain approximately the same at about 1.3
million tons per year.30 Coincidentally, deep-sea nodules contain cobalt
(.2-.25%), nickel (1.25-1.5%), and copper (1-1.4%).31
Though the report discusses various alternatives to lithium-ion
batteries for energy storage that may become commercially viable at some
point, it is more likely that lithium-ion batteries will remain the primary
source of energy storage for the foreseeable future.32 Present indicators
suggest that lithium-ion battery storage has become a technology on which
policy makers rely in seeking a transition to clean energy, which may
necessarily increase lithium-ion usage in the future.33
B. Previous Experiences with Extractive Industries and What They Can
Teach Us About the Future of Deep-Sea Mineral Mining Regulation
One of the more prescient examples of negative first and second order
effects resulting from mineral mining comes from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). This section shows that in the presence of
vast mineral wealth, ineffective regulations for the mining industry in the
DRC spawned a host of negative byproducts that endure to this day. Next,
this section uses the DRC example to show what unintended consequences
may result from such ineffective regulation. Lastly, this section compares
the incentive structure in the DRC to the current incentive structure in
deep-sea mineral mining.
As early as 1958, the DRC was the worlds largest producer of
industrial diamonds and cobalt.34 After winning independence on June 30,
29. HUND ET AL., supra note 5, at 12; Mineral Production to Soar as Demand for Clean
Energy
Increases,
THE
WORLD
BANK
(May
11,
2020),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news (choose press releases under view by news type; then
search mineral production to soar as demand for clean energy increases; choose article
with identical title). [https://perma.cc/XH8W-S5BN].
30. HUND ET AL., supra note 5, at 73.
31. Gallagher, supra note 1.
32. HUND ET AL., supra note 5, at 59-69; Gallagher, supra note 1.
33. California Gov. Newsom Calls Transition to Electric Cars an Economic
Imperative,
NATIONAL
PUBLIC
RADIO
(Sept.
24,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/24/916625380/california-governor-on-his-order-to-bansale-of-new-gasoline-vehicles-by-2035 [https://perma.cc/NUN4-57T3].
34. Hubert André-Dumont, Mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Case
Study, 57 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 9-1, 9-4 (2011).
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1960, the DRC plunged into a period of unrest that lasted until President
Mobutu effectively seized power in 1965.35 Mobutu ruled from 1965 until
1991, a period marked by social and economic decline and the ultimately
unsuccessful nationalization of a large Belgian mining company, Union
Miniére.36
In 1994, the Congolese government sought to open the country to
mining investors through an initial series of partnerships with its stateowned mining company, La Générale des Carriéres et des Mines
(Gécamines).37 These partnerships did not endure, however. The eastern
portion of the DRC once again plunged into war from 1998 to 2001,
resulting in a division of control of the countrys mineral rich portions
between the DRC government, Rwanda, Uganda, and Jean-Pierre Bemba,
the leader of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo.38 Unrest in mineralrich areas of the DRC persists to this day, driven in part by the wealth
associated with control of mining activities and commercial agreements
made with neighboring countries.39
As foreign investment in Congolese mining activities began, and
increased, after 1994, the national debt became untenable for the DRC
government.40 In 2010, the DRC received debt relief through the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Banks International
Development Association, which reduced the external debt to
approximately $2.9 billion.41 As of 2010, the DRCs gross domestic
product (GDP) stood around $12.5 billion, according to the Minister of
Planning.42 It was estimated in 2009 that the DRCs mining industry
accounted for 70% of total export earnings and that as of 2010, the industry
had grown by 20%.43 Although the relative size of the mining industry is
quite large as compared to other economic activities, the Congos
government collected less than $200 million from that sector in 2010.44

35. Id. at 9-8 to 9-10.
36. Id. at 9-10.
37. Id. at 9-11.
38. Id. at 9-11 to 9-13.
39. Id. at 9-15.
40. Id. at 9-18 to 9-19.
41. Id. at 9-24.
42. Id. at 9-16.
43. Id. at 9-17.
44. Id. This lack of officially reported state revenue can also be explained by the
presence of corruption. See DR Congo Loses $750m in Mining Revenues to Corruption,
AL JAZEERA (July 21, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/7/21/dr-congo-loses750m-in-mining-revenues-to-corruption [https://perma.cc/8CTS-B4QF].
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Prior to 2002, the DRC primarily used mining conventions as the
vehicle for enabling foreign mining operations.45 Mining conventions were
development agreements between foreign organizations and the
government.46 In 2002, the DRC adopted the Mining Code, a law that
encompasses licensing and environmental protections; however, many
issues still persist to this day.47 In 2007, for example, the DRC government
signed a mining agreement with China, which involved exchanging
mineral rights for building infrastructure.48 This agreement is comparable
in substance and appearance to the mining conventions that the DRCs
Mining Code sought to eliminate.
Today, the DRC has an estimated untapped reserve of $24 trillion in
mineral deposits.49 Further, the DRC is the worlds largest producer of
cobalt, supplying about 70% of global demand.50 In the presence of strong
global demand and access to vast deposits, it is no wonder why unrest and
corruption have been the hallmarks of the mining industry in the DRC.
Both rent-seeking behavior from domestic government officials and
access to great wealth for international actors has come into conflict with,
and at times has counterintuitively promoted, unwanted domestic mining
activities. Artisanal mining, or the act of extracting minerals by hand on
an individual basis, is one such activity that is common in the DRC.51
Although this practice is referred to as illegal, in 2002 the DRC

45. André-Dumont, supra note 34, at 9-18.
46. Id. at 9-18 to 9-19.
47. Id. at 9-27 to 9-28. United Nations attempts to improve the mineral mining industry
in the Congo from 2003 to 2008 were largely ineffective due to the lack of enforcement
from the international community. See Thiery Vircoulon, Behind the Problem of Conflict
Minerals in DR Congo: Governance, INTL CRISIS GRP (Apr. 19, 2011)
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/behindproblem-conflict-minerals-dr-congo-governance
[https://perma.cc/M8BS-4HHK].
Although the exact amount is unknown, it is estimated that hundreds of millions of dollars
of state mining revenue went missing from the state owned Gécamines between 2011 and
2014. Annie Callaway, Powering Down Corruption: Tackling Transparency and Human
Rights Risks from Congos Cobalt Mines to Global Supply Chains, ENOUGH PROJECT (Oct.
2018), https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/PoweringDownCorruption_Enough
_Oct2018-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/35AU-XKA9].
48. André-Dumont, supra note 34, at 9-28.
49. DR Congo: UN Advises Prudent Use of Abundant Resources to Spur Development,
UN NEWS (Oct. 10, 2011), https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/10/390912-dr-congo-unadvises-prudent-use-abundant-resources-spur-development#.WYyOHrIrLrc
[https://perma.cc/6QC3-WVAD].
50. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., supra note 25, at 51.
51. AMNESTY INTL, supra note 22, at 4.
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government identified zones approved for artisanal mining.52 In the areas
where China holds concessions, the DRC government has deployed troops
to prevent artisanal mining, but the practice still occurs.53 It is estimated
that 20% of cobalt currently exported from the DRC is a result of the
artisanal mining efforts of around 110,000 regular miners, a number that
rises to around 150,000 on a seasonal basis.54
Artisanal miners suffer from both health and safety issues. Some of
these miners short and long-term health issues include the potentially fatal
hard metal lung disease, . . . respiratory sensitization, asthma, shortness
of breath, and decreased pulmonary function.55 Though there is no
accurate data on the total number of artisanal mine collapse accidents, at
least 82 miners died between 2014 and 2015.56 In 2014, UNICEF
estimated that approximately 40,000 children worked in mines across
southern DRC, many of them cobalt mines working up to 12 hours per
day.57 Human rights abuses as an externality were certainly not expected
consequences of the global increase in demand for technological
advancement and are likely not a desired byproduct of the clean energy
movement, yet these conditions persist.
Although the 2002 Mining Code purports to regulate the artisanal
mining industry, the lack of effective government regulation in practice is
evidence that not all aspects of the code are enforceable by the
government.58 And as previously noted, the DRC Mining Codes
prohibition on mining conventions did not inhibit the DRC government
from entering into agreements that were similar in substance to previous
mining conventions.
52. Amnesty Intl Public Statement, DRC: Crisis in Mines Requires Sustainable
Solution, AMNESTY INTL (July 25, 2019) https://www.amnesty.org/en/wpcontent/uploads/2021/05/AFR6207722019ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2MK-49CF].
53. Id.
54. AMNESTY INTL, supra note 22, at 16. Recent government efforts suggest a
formalization of artisanal mining efforts where the DRC government will purchase cobalt
from artisanal miners. Pratima Desai and Helen Reid, Congo Likely to Start Artisanal
Cobalt Mining Within 8 Weeks, REUTERS (July 12, 2021), https://www.reuters
.com/article/congo-cobalt-artisanal/congo-likely-to-start-artisanal-cobalt-buying-within8-weeks-idUSL5N2OJ4MM [https://perma.cc/T5ER-9RP2].
55. AMNESTY INTL, supra note 22, at 22.
56. Id. at 24.
57. Exposed: Child Labor Behind Smart Phone and Electric Car Batteries, AMNESTY
INTL (Jan. 19, 2016) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/01/child-labourbehind-smart-phone-and-electric-car-batteries/ [https://perma.cc/27P9-8AD9].
58. See Vircoulon, supra note 47 (noting that United Nations actions to affect change,
followed by domestic DRC action, were all ineffective at stemming the tide of illegal, or
unwanted, mining practices).
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These domestic policy enforcement failures have inspired
international action. Starting in 2003, the United Nations passed a series
of resolutions to halt the illegal exploitation of minerals in the DRC.59
After these efforts proved ineffective, the United Nations called on the
international community to assist.60 Sanctions on both individuals and
companies have largely proved ineffective, and this is partially due to the
lack of States political willpower to create such compliance in the DRC.61
DRC domestic efforts to regulate the industry, from reducing military
involvement in the mining industry to attempts at removing rebel groups
from mineral-rich provinces, have also been ineffective.62
One such example of a country attempting to answer the UNs call
was when the United States passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) in 2010.63 The DoddFrank Act requires, in part, that American companies (1) determine
whether certain minerals exist in their supply chain, (2) conduct
investigations to determine the origin of the minerals, and (3) publish the
findings of their investigations.64 A companys determination that the
minerals in their supply chain did not originate in rebel-controlled mines
is confirmed by an external auditor before receiving a DRC conflict free
label.65
This legislation did not achieve its intended purpose. In a hearing
before the Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade in
May 2012, Chairman Miller of California noted that compliance with this
regulatory measure cost U.S. companies between $9 and $16 billion while
also erecting a de facto trade embargo against the DRC.66 The committee
also noted that the de facto embargo actually incentivized further growth
of the mineral black market in the DRC.67 The Dodd-Frank Acts noble
intent did not produce the ultimately desired result: to halt the use of
conflict minerals and to disincentivize improper mining practices.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 3224, 111th
Cong. (2010).
64. Vircoulon, supra note 47.
65. Id.
66. The Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502: Impacts on America
and the Congo: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intl Monetary Poly and Trade of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2012).
67. Id.
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Another gap in the Dodd-Frank Act is that it only applies to companies
who are required to file disclosures with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.68 In other
words, the Act only applies to a small portion of publicly traded companies
in the U.S., not private companies. Though some sort of domestic
regulation might be necessary to ensure U.S. companies do not support
unwanted mining practices, corporate disclosure is an incomplete
mechanism for effectuating policy goals aimed at adjusting mineral
mining practices abroad.
In all, mineral mining in the DRC is a remarkably valuable industry,
responsible for satisfying much of the worlds demand for minerals used
in modern technology. The DRC has attempted domestic regulation and
enforcement to address the problem, and countries like the United States
have enacted their own domestic laws to assist in regulating the industry.
An effective international enforcement mechanism is the missing piece.
To avoid similar pitfalls with future deep-sea mineral mining regulation,
the United Nations, through the ISA and ITLOS, needs a proper
enforcement mechanism to ensure uniform compliance with rules and
norms.
II. UNILATERAL PROBLEMS: NATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES AND WHY DOMESTIC REGULATORY REGIMES ARE
INSUFFICIENT TO MANAGE DEEP-SEA MINERAL MINING
Unilateral regulatory efforts appear to be ineffective mechanisms for
regulating deep-sea mineral mining. Whether it be a States currently
structured judicial remedies that may not supply redress for plaintiffs, or
unilateral policy changes by an individual State with regard to the
licensing process or the conduct of mining, it is not clear that unilateral
regulatory changes will be sufficient. This section discusses (1) how the
United States federal court system may be insufficient to provide
remedies for controversies arising out of deep-sea mineral mining
activities; and (2) how differences in deep-sea mining regulations between
individual countries may lead to both regulatory arbitrage and a race to the
bottom. This section also briefly explains that any changes to domestic
structures will not solve jurisdictional problems, thus making recovery
more difficult in a setting where likely defendants might be international
actors. In short, the purpose of this section is to show that unilateral
68. Disclosing the Use of Conflict Minerals, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMMN
https://www.sec.gov/opa/Article/2012-2012-163htm---related-materials.html
[https://perma.cc/93BW-KLF5] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
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updates to domestic regulatory regimes are necessary, but if they occur in
isolation, or without coordination and agreement from other participating
States, these efforts will likely not achieve the change they seek.
A. U.S. Courts Will Likely be Ineffective Forums for Adjudication of
Complaints Arising from Mineral Mining Environmental Disasters on
the Ocean
Remedies issued by the judiciary serve an important function in
redressing wrongs in an ex-post fashion where ex-ante regulation may
have failed or where an actor failed to abide by regulations. There are two
significant barriers a future plaintiff may face if injured in some fashion
by deep-sea mineral mining activities: (1) if the harm is felt on a global
scale, both federal common law and the special injury requirement erect
significant barriers to recovery; (2) deep-sea mineral mining litigation will
likely occur under admiralty jurisdiction, and with admiralty jurisdiction
comes limitation of liability, which would limit recovery to the value of
the vessel.
As discussed in the environmental impact portion of this paper, one
potential injury may involve plume creation on a massive scale that
destroys, or irreparably damages, the ocean ecosystem. Plaintiffs seeking
redress for injuries sustained from large-scale environmental impacts face
an uncertain future with regard to proper venue and controlling law,
however.69 If a defendant is able to successfully remove a case to admiralty
court, it is likely that under current rules, the defendant would only be
liable up to the value of the vessel involved in the incident. Though
69. Given the potential variation with such a hypothetical deep-sea mineral mining
claim, it seems likely that such a case would likely be brought in, or removed to, admiralty
court, thus obviating much discussion by way of comparison to cases concerning recovery
from global warming-related injuries. If deep-sea mineral mining claims are not heard in
admiralty court, it is more difficult to say whether state or federal court would provide the
proper venue. Plaintiffs seeking redress for injuries sustained by the effects of global
warning from fossil fuel producers have received varied signals in this regard. In City of
Oakland v. BP, the Ninth Circuit held that a federal court does not have jurisdiction over a
state law nuisance claim. 960 F.3d 570, 575 (9th Cir. 2020) ([w]e hold that the state-law
claim for public nuisance does not arise under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §
1331 . . . ). In City of New York v. Chevron Corp., however, the Second Circuit held that
state law nuisance claims regarding global warming are displaced by federal common law
because of the federal interests implicated in the action. 993 F.3d 81, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2021)
([t]his is because such quarrels often implicate two federal interests that are incompatible
with the application of state law: (i) the overriding . . . need for a uniform rule of decision
on matters influencing national energy and environmental policy, and (ii) basic interests of
federalism.) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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domestic judiciaries are not the sole source solution for deterring bad
behavior and redressing wrongs, this paper argues that determining proper
liability limits in a similar manner to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 will be
helpful in erecting an effective regime that future plaintiffs can rely on.
Federal legislation can be a powerful tool in this department to properly
adjust incentives.
1. Environmental Concerns with Deep-Sea Mineral Mining
One of the greatest unknowns associated with deep-sea mineral
mining is the environmental impacts of those efforts.70 These impacts
include immediate effects of deep-sea mining on known flora and fauna in
addition to potential second order effects on the ocean ecosystem as a
whole. Absent the occurrence of large-scale commercial mining projects,
these effects remain conjecture, however.
Researchers are concerned with both the effects of mining on the
ocean floor and of sediment plumes that mining activities create.71 Current
deep-sea mining methods involve using a collector vehicle to gather
mineral nodules that are then brought to a surface ship for processing.72
This vacuum process gathers all material, including nodules and any flora
and fauna that may be collocated with these minerals, from the top ten to
fifteen centimeters of the ocean floor.73 After the nodules are pumped to
the surface processing ship, the minerals are separated from unwanted
materials, creating a slurry, which is then released back into the water,
releasing a second sediment plume.74 Though the effects of these plumes
are not well understood, one study suggests that plumes might be more
localized.75 The general concern with plume creation is a plumes potential
impact on the ocean ecosystem, whether through the disbursement of toxic
materials released throughout the water column or sediment clogging filter
feeding organisms, among other things.76
In addition to the concern about sediment plume creation at the ocean
floor, the deep ocean regenerates at a glacial rate: new sediment
70. Kaikkonen et al., supra note 17, at 1183; see also Gallagher, supra note 1.
71. Kaikkonen et al., supra note 17, at 1186.
72. Gallagher, supra note 1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Jeremy Spearman et al., Measurement and Modeling of Deep-Sea Sediment Plumes
and Implications for Deep Sea Mining, 10 SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 1 (2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-61837-y.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SEW2-NB
V2] (Sediment plumes in this study traveled only 9km before settling on the ocean floor).
76. Gallagher, supra note 1.
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accumulates at a rate of about one millimeter every thousand years.77 Thus,
this method, which is the only method predicted to become commercially
viable in the near future, functionally means that areas disturbed by such
activity would be unlikely to recover.78
Aside from sediment plumes, environmental researchers are also
concerned with noise pollution that mining vessels create, the overall lack
of understanding of the ocean food web, and the role the deep ocean plays
in the overall system.79 In 2018 for example, scientists studied the carbon
sequestration role that bacteria play in the deep ocean.80 The study
explained that these bacteria play an important role in the carbon cycle and
that in the North Atlantic, they were responsible for sequestering between
15-45% of carbon.81 Another study found that benthic bacteria consume
inorganic carbon, but that there was not enough information to understand
the effects deep-sea mineral mining might have on these bacteria and their
ability to digest carbon if the ecosystem is disrupted.82
In sum, the degree of potential environmental harm associated with
deep-sea mining may be limited to the distance a plume travels, or might
extend far greater depending on how the food web is affected. Land-based
mining efforts have environmental impacts of their own, and those impacts
have spilled over beyond the borders of mining sites.83 The broad
comparison between land-based and sea-based impacts goes only to show
that mining operations have created numerous, unintended environmental
consequences. Such prior experiences on land, paired with indicators that
reasonably could lead one to believe that sea-based operations may have
significant impacts, counsel a robust system of international enforcement
of mining regulations.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Kaikkonen et al., supra note 17, at 1187.
80. Maria G. Pachiadaki et al., Major Role of Nitrite-Oxidizing Bacteria in the Dark
Ocean Carbon Fixation, 358 SCIENCE 1046, 1046 (2017).
81. Id.
82. Andrew K. Sweetman et al., Key Role of Bacteria in the Short-Term Cycling of
Carbon at the Abyssal Seafloor in a Low Particulate Organic Carbon Flux Region of the
Eastern Pacific Ocean, 64 LIMNOLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY 694, 709 (2018).
83. Adator Stephanie Worlanyo & Li Jiangfeng, Evaluating the Environmental and
Economic Impact of Mining for Post-Mined Land Restoration and Land-Use: A Review,
279 J. ENVT MGMT. 1, 1 (2021). Land-based mining has affected soil and water quality in
addition to disruption and destruction of plant and animal life. Id. at 2. Although effects on
soil are more localized to mining and dump sites, effects on surface and sub-surface water
can extend far beyond a mining site. Some mining activities have removed large swaths of
vegetation, affecting migratory bird patterns. In other cases, discharge of mining waste
containing toxic heavy metals made the surrounding area uninhabitable. Id. at 3-8.
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2. Federal Common Law and Historical Adjudication of Environmental
Cases
The judiciary is not fully equipped to effectively adjudicate claims or
properly enforce deep-sea mining regulations. First, case law shows that
when injuries result from large-scale environmental accidents or the
effects of rising sea levels brought on by global warming, courts in the
U.S. are without the ability to effectively redress a wrong in its entirety.84
Given the unknown scope of potential environmental impacts, it may be
possible that future deep-sea mineral mining controversies would be
subject to similar limitations.
In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., members of a
federally recognized tribe of Inupiat Native Alaskans brought a suit
against ExxonMobil and other defendants alleging that massive
greenhouse gas emissions emitted by the Energy Producers have resulted
in global warming, which, in turn, has severely eroded the land where the
City of Kivalina sits and threatens it with imminent destruction.85 One of
the issues in the case was the existence of federal common law and
whether it was competent to provide a remedy in this situation.86 The Ninth
Circuit held that federal common law governed environmental public
nuisance claims.87 The court also noted that such a claim would require
proof that the defendant unreasonably interfered with the enjoyment of a
public right and, thus, caused the harm.88 The court conceded that the
federal common law is subject to the paramount authority of Congress
because federal common law is used to fill gaps in legislation.89
Ultimately, the court found that Kivalina and its residents were
without remedy because the Clean Air Act and previous case law displaced
their federal common law public nuisance claim for damages.90 As a final
word, the court explained that their conclusion obviously does not aid
Kivalina, which itself is being displaced by the rising sea . . . [b]ut the
84. See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.
2012); Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp. (In re Exxon Valdez), 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.
1997).
85. Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 853.
86. Id. at 855-56.
87. Id. at 855.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 856.
90. Id. at 857; See also Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424
(2011) (holding that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any
federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel
fired powerplants.).
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solution to Kivalinas dire circumstances must rest in the hands of the
legislative and executive branches of our government, not the federal
common law.91 If future deep-sea mineral mining complaints are brought
by communities who sustain injuries caused by the industry generally, it
may be possible that courts applying the federal common law would
similarly defer to congressionally supplied remedies instead of creating a
federal common law remedy.92
The Courts deference to Congressional action does not leave
plaintiffs entirely without hope for redressability, however.93 In a way, the
court implicitly states that it would be willing to issue judgments when
Congress or the President is the source of that authority.
Another case highlights how the injury requirement may raise barriers
to recovery. In Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., one of the many cases
arising out of the Exxon Valdez disaster, the plaintiffs brought a suit under
general maritime law for non-economic damages.94 The complaint alleged
that the spill harmed an integrated system of communal subsistence . . .
inextricably bound up not only with the harvesting of natural resources
damaged by the spill but also with the exchange, sharing and processing
of those resources as the foundation of an established economic, social,
and religious structure.95 The court held that a party could not recover
damages for a public nuisance claim unless they are able to show a special
injury different in kind from that suffered by the general public.96 The
court further held that even though the class may have suffered such an
injury more severely than other members of the public, there would be
no recovery because the injuries alleged in the complaint were shared by
all Alaskans.97
In a worst-case scenario, the proliferation of commercial mining
projects may have a significant, negative effect on ocean ecosystems
similar in scope, or potentially larger, than oil-related environmental
disasters. If this were to be the case, a community adversely affected by
such industry collective action may face difficulties recovering under
federal common law in the absence of specific federal legislation creating
a cause of action. The special injury requirement under federal common

91. Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858.
92. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1420 (1972).
93. Native Village of Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858.
94. Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp. (In re Exxon Valdez), 104 F.3d 1196, 1197
(9th Cir. 1997).
95. Id. at 1198 (internal quotations omitted).
96. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
97. Id.
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law, thus, does not bode well for future hypothetical plaintiffs injured by
mining practices.
The threat of litigation can serve as an effective deterrent against
unwanted behavior, but the lack of domestic redressability leaves a gap.
This gap may be filled by domestic legislation, but such action would only
affect proceedings in U.S. courts and, most importantly, it would be
retrospective. Changes to the U.S. regulatory regime will be necessary to
ensure ex-post remedies are effectively available where they ought to be,
but enforcement mechanisms at the international level will ensure
litigation at the national level is not the only deterrent.
3. Admiralty Law and Its Applicability to Deep-Sea Mineral Mining
Admiralty cases are exclusively the providence of federal courts in the
United States.98 It is generally the case that an admiralty tort claim must
(1) involve a vessel; (2) satisfy the location test, where the injury occurs
on navigable waters; and (3) satisfy the connection test, where the activity
either has the potential to disrupt maritime commerce or that it shows a
substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.99 First, the term
vessel in Admiralty tort cases is broadly construed and has included both
off-shore oil drilling rigs100 and dredging barges.101 Second, the location
test does not require that both the tort and the injury be relegated to
navigable waters. The Admiralty Extension Act prescribes admiralty
jurisdiction in cases where damage is caused by a vessel on navigable
waters even though the damage is consummated on land.102 Third, the
connection test involves an intermediate level of generality where the
court assesses the general features of the type of incident to determine if
that sort of incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime
commerce.103
98. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
99. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534
(1995) (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 365-67) (internal quotations omitted).
100. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959); In re Oil Spill by the
Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 808 F.Supp.2d 943,
950 (E.D. La. 2011), affd sub nom. In re DEEPWATER HORIZON, 745 F.3d 157 (5th
Cir. 2014).
101. Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 497 (2005) (holding a vessel is any
watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation.).
102. 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2021).
103. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 538. In that case, a dredging barge that collapsed a tunnel
under the Chicago River satisfied the connection test because of its potential disruptive
impact on maritime commerce. It seems likely that deep-sea mineral mining vessels would
even more readily satisfy this test.
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The courts reasoning in the Deepwater Horizon case is particularly
instructive when considering whether deep-sea mineral mining ships are
likely to be classified as vessels. There, the court found that the drilling
platform was a vessel, because it was practically capable of transportation,
it was only connected to the ocean floor by a well head, and there were no
other legs or attachments.104 There is no requirement that the platform be
in motion to be considered a vessel.105 Because deep-sea mining is
conducted by a ship that is not permanently moored to the ocean floor, but
rather controls a piece of equipment that operates on the ocean floor, it
will likely be considered a vessel for the purposes of admiralty
jurisdiction. The location and connection tests would likely also be
satisfied for the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction.106
Thus, it is likely that two of the most foreseeable future controversies
would fall under admiralty jurisdiction. If a future case involves an injury
resulting from plume creation or nearly any other activity attributable to a
mining vessel on the high seas, the case would fall within admiralty
jurisdiction. If mining activities create more attenuated injury, like
destruction of ocean ecosystems and the oceans ability to perform carbon
capture, plaintiffs bringing such a claim may find their cases removed to
admiralty court.
One example of litigation surrounding environmental disasters at sea
was the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.107 After the disaster, numerous
claimants brought a suit seeking damages for injuries sustained as a result
of the incident.108 These claimants sought recovery under general
maritime law, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), . . . and various state
laws.109 The court found that the case fell under admiralty jurisdiction
because the drilling platform was considered a vessel.110
Relying on federal maritime law, the court dismissed the state law
claims holding that state law must yield to the needs of a uniform
maritime law.111 The court explained that to subject a discharger to the
varying laws of each state into which its oil has flowed would contravene
a fundamental purpose of maritime law: [t]o preserve adequate harmony

104. In re Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 808 F.Supp.2d at 950-51.
105. Id. at 950.
106. See id. at 950-51.
107. Id. at 947-48.
108. Id. at 947.
109. Id. at 948.
110. Id. at 949.
111. Id. at 954 (citing Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
373 (1959)).
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and appropriate uniform rules relating to maritime matters.112 Although
states do have the ability to create remedies for oil spills that occur within
their territorial waters, they do not have the ability to create remedies for
incidents that occur on the high seas.113 A future deep-sea mineral mining
claim would likely be subject to similar reasoning, which would result in
uniform application of admiralty law and dismissal of any state law claim.
Thus, in some cases, the normal tort analysis, and the injury
requirement, do not properly account for the magnitude of modern-day
environmental harms that may affect large groups of plaintiffs. As in
Deepwater Horizon, courts seek to promote commerce, and as a
byproduct, will limit liability unless a federal law is in place to expand
liability beyond the value of the vessel. The history of American case law,
accordingly, supports the contention that future environmental harms
sustained by a large class of plaintiffs may not result in full redress of the
injury received.
Federal courts have explained, however, that the application of
maritime law in admiralty cases would be subordinate to Congressional
action.114 The cases mentioned above also show that state law will likely
not be able to provide remedies for injuries committed by deep-sea mining
vessels and their owners. In short, the American judiciary has signaled that
(1) Congress is the appropriate institution for drafting regulations to
govern liability in admiralty, and (2) it would honor and enforce those
regulations as the sole source of authority where admiralty jurisdiction
lies.
4. Limitation of Liability in Admiralty Law
Once a case is determined to be in admiralty jurisdiction, liability is
typically limited to the value of a vessel.115 The current version of the law
reads: The liability of the owner of a vessel for any claim, debt, or
liability . . . shall not . . . exceed the value of the vessel and pending
freight.116 The Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the Act was to
encourage investments in ships and their employment in commerce[,] so
112. Id. at 954 (quoting Kickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920)).
113. Id. at 957; see also Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 339
(1973).
114. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986)
(holding that general maritime law applies to the extent it is not displaced by federal
statute); see also S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (Congress has paramount
power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country.).
115. 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2021).
116. Id.
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that the shipping interests of this country might not suffer in competition
with foreign vessels.117
In the case of large-scale environmental disasters where such impacts
create thousands of plaintiffs, as in the Exxon Valdez spill of 1989 or
Deepwater Horizon spill in 2010, this framework of liability would have
limited the defendants liability to the value of the drilling equipment or
transportation equipment involved in the incident. Congress made an
exception to this liability ceiling by passing the OPA,118 which set higher
liability limits for defendants responsible for damages caused by oil spills:
[T]he total of the liability of a responsible party under section
2702 of this title and any such removal costs incurred by, or on
behalf of, the responsible party . . . shall not exceed . . . $3,000 per
gross ton, . . . for an offshore facility except a deepwater port, the
total of all removal costs plus $75,000,000, . . . [and] for any
onshore facility and deepwater port, $350,000,000.119
The most important feature of the OPA was that it set forth a higher
level of liability for oil spills as opposed to other maritime injuries. Today,
no such higher level of liability exists for deep-sea mineral mining.120 In
fact, the only deep-sea mining related liability statute creates civil
penalties or criminal fines for conducting mining operations in violation
of U.S. law.121 In other words, Congress would have to pass new
legislation creating increased liability for deep sea mineral mining
companies who have the potential to create environmental effects similar
in scope to oil spills.
Without such a measure, deep-sea mineral mining companies may be
able to seek protection under the Limitation of Liability Act, which would

117. Am. Car & Foundry Co. v. Brassert, 289 U.S. 261, 263 (1933).
118. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1990).
119. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2018).
120. KEITH MACMASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY FOR DEEP SEABED MINING IN THE
AREA: AN URGENT CASE FOR A ROBUST STRICT LIABILITY REGIME 19 (Schulich Sch. Of
Law, Working Paper No. 14 (2019)). It is possible that deep-sea mining liability may be
included under a separate domestic liability regime in the U.S., but the implications are
currently unknown.
121. 30 U.S.C. § 1465 (2018) (Any vessel documented or numbered under the laws of
the United States . . . which is used in any violation of this chapter, any regulation issued
under this chapter, or any term condition, or restriction of any license or permit . . . shall
be liable in rem for any civil penalty assessed or criminal fine imposed and may be
proceeded against in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof.).

210

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:1&2

limit their liability to the value of their mining vessel and equipment.122
This raises concerns about redressability as we have seen in the cases
mentioned above. The lack of such legislation would also leave absent an
incentive for deep-sea mineral mining companies to make their best effort
to mitigate environmental harms. Congresss normal fact-finding activities
would likely be frustrated by the current underdeveloped understanding of
deep-sea mining impacts. In short, without a more accurate understanding
of mining impacts, Congress may be unable to appropriately express
liability in terms of a number figure as it did with the OPA. Such liability
increases may be necessary in the future, even if they are difficult to
determine at the moment.
5. Conclusions with Regard to the American Judiciary
In all, Congress and the President, through administrative agencies
like the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), have
the ability to adjust the course of future deep-sea mineral mining litigation
in a manner that would positively affect a plaintiffs ability to recover
damages commensurable to the injury received. Such a structure may
include increases to liability limits in admiralty cases similarly to the OPA.
It may also include enacting new legislation to create a cause of action for
more attenuated injuries so that courts would not have to defer to federal
common law.
These changes do not wholly address all of the challenges associated
with deep-sea mineral mining regulation, but they would fill an important
domestic gap in how the judiciary would meet the challenge. A positive
byproduct could be that sufficient liability limits may deter mining
companies from committing bad acts and that plaintiffs could more readily
rely on a courts ability to grant a sufficient remedy.
Despite the potential for positive unilateral reform, it is not possible
for all cases and controversies occurring around the world to be effectively
brought into a United States court. The federal courts jurisdiction is not
unlimited. Even if liability limits under admiralty jurisdiction are
increased, it may not be possible for a plaintiff to draw an international
defendant into a U.S. court. If that defendant is an individual or citizen of
a different country with no place of business or meaningful tie to the U.S.,

122. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 535
(1995) (maritime law ordinarily treats an appurtenance attached to a vessel in navigable
waters as part of the vessel itself.).
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the defendant may choose not to defend the case, leaving the plaintiff with
a judgment and no mechanism to collect damages.123
B. Domestic Regulatory Regimes and How Differences Between
Countries May Create Externalities that Undercut Efficacy
1. Mineral Mining Regulatory Regimes by Country
In order to comply with UNCLOS requirements, contractors seeking
exploratory mining licenses must satisfy two requirements: (1) they must
be nationals of a signatory State or effectively controlled by the signatory
State, and (2) the signatory State must sponsor the license seeker.124
Sponsorship requires States to establish domestic regulatory regimes.125
These domestic regimes ensure that contractors comply with obligations
and the existence of these regimes exempt States from liability for
contractor actions.126 Though States have some degree of flexibility in the
regulatory regimes they adopt, such regimes must adhere to, at a
minimum, the environmental standards set forth by the ISA.127
As of 2018, thirty-one States, including non-signatories like the
United States, have adopted such domestic regulatory regimes.128 Even
prior to this formalization under the ISA, the United States passed the
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resource Act of 1980, which provided an
interim procedure for deep-sea mineral mining operations.129 The Act

123. Universal jurisdiction for certain types of crimes has been successful, but only when
countries subject themselves to such jurisdiction. Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in
a Dangerous World: A Weapon for all Nations Against International Crime, 9 MSU-DCU
J. INTL L. 1, 2-5, 23 (2000) (explaining universal jurisdiction generally and its limits).
Deep-sea mineral mining infractions are likely not good candidates for universal
jurisdiction as countries would be economically incentivized to protect their corporations
from liability in foreign courts.
124. INTL SEABED AUTH., COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EXISTING NATIONAL
LEGISLATION ON DEEP SEABED MINING 3 (2019) https://www.isa.org.jm/files/files/doc
uments/compstudy-nld.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8RM-ZXP5].
125. Id. This requirement was suggested in an ITLOS advisory opinion and later
referenced at the twenty-third session of the ISA in 2017.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 4.
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id.
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forbade extraction of minerals unless a contractor received a license from
the United States or a reciprocating state.130
Signatory States legislation is largely similar.131 All States stress the
need for environmental protection, however, standards vary.132 Some
States, like the United Kingdom, Nauru, and Tonga, set environmental
protection as a condition upon which a license is granted.133 On the other
end of the spectrum, States like Russia only mention universally
recognized principles of international law, representing the minimum
legislative requirements under the ISA.134 Chinas environmental
protection scheme spells out a robust set of procedures including
obligations for contractors to take necessary measures to prevent and
reduce impacts of pollution, to assess the impact of exploration and
exploitation activities, and establish monitoring programs.135
Most States provide conditions on which a license may be revoked,
including an option for sponsoring States to revoke such a license in order
to protect the marine environment.136 Domestic regimes differ on the
specified responsibilities of contractors with regard to environmental
impact.137 Eleven signatory States legislation provides for robust
monitoring and supervision of activities, but this list does not included
Russia.138
Though the United States is not currently a signatory to UNCLOS, its
domestic law reflects many of the principles espoused by the
Convention.139 The United States laws concerning deep-sea mineral
mining are contained in 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1472, also known as the Deep
Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, and 15 C.F.R. Part 970, which

130. Id. Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Italy adopted similar
legislation from 1982-1985. Id. Russia, Germany, New Zealand, and the Czech Republic
adopted similar legislation after the ITLOS advisory opinion from 1994 to 2000. Id. at 6.
131. Id. at 10-14.
132. Id. at 18.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 14.
137. Id. at 15-16. Fiji and Nauru, for example, require that contractors not dump minerals
material or waste, while China and Germany explain that contractors must [p]rotect the
marine environment in the Area.
138. Id. at 17.
139. The United States adopted domestic regulations prior to UNCLOS creation and in
subsequent law highlighted the principle that the hard mineral resources of the deep
seabed are the common heritage of mankind . . . [ensuring] nondiscriminatory access to
such resources for all nations. 15 C.F.R. § 970.100(b)(1) (2021).
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explains licensing procedures.140 License approval in the United States is
controlled by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).141 The regulatory approach is a flexible one, allowing NOAA to
issue separate regulations in recognition of the evolving nature of the deepsea mining industry.142
In a puzzling break with the spirit of flexibility, however, current
regulations explain that the effects of destruction of benthos, blanketing
off benthic fauna and dilution of the food supply, and surface plume effects
on fish larvae are not expected to be significant.143 The final part of that
regulation explains that administrators will rely on the environmental
conclusions outlined in the code when assessing site specific
environmental impact statements.144
As will be discussed later in this paper, these domestic regulatory
regimes have not yet been tested under changing incentives that might be
associated with large-scale mining commercialization. The differences in
domestic regulatory regimes signal that States may be taking incongruous
approaches to deep-sea mineral mining and that such differences may
result in varied practices. Though the ISA has encouraged States to adopt
national legislation to assist in enforcing both the rules and the principles
of UNCLOS, we already see potential issues with future enforcement.145
Absent a robust enforcement mechanism at the international level,
effective management of deep-sea mineral mining may be tenuous.
2. Differences in Regulatory Regimes May Lead to Regulatory Arbitrage
and a Race to the Bottom
As outlined above, differing environmental standards alone may make
deep-sea mineral mining licenses easier to obtain in countries with less
stringent regulations as opposed to ones where environmental regulations
could serve to limit license sponsorship and issuance. This creates an
140. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-72 (2021); 15 C.F.R. pt. 970 (2021).
141. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1403(12), 1412(a) (2021).
142. 15 C.F.R. § 970.100(c) (2021).
143. Id. at § 970.701(b)(2).
144. Id. at § 970.701(c).
145. See, e.g., INTL SEABED AUTH., supra note 124, at 15, 18. Russia, for example,
explicitly mentions in its domestic regime that contractors will receive the full protection
of the Russian government when conducting their activities and only generally mentions
environmental protections, while states like the United Kingdom make environmental
protection a prerequisite for licensing. Id. Thus, if required to revoke a license for a
contractors breach, of either the sponsoring states law or the ISA, such enforcement may
vary by state.
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incentive for large mining corporations to shop for an optimal sponsoring
State when seeking to begin the licensing process. Because environmental
impacts of large-scale efforts are not yet known as there have yet to exist
any large-scale mining efforts, there is not yet an incentive for
corporations to engage in this type of regulatory arbitrage. If regulatory
arbitrage does occur once deep-sea mineral mining becomes economical
and begins in earnest on a large-scale, it is possible that countries will be
incentivized to lower environmental standards in the licensing process in
order to retain or attract corporations.
Additionally, early State sponsorship of mining activities in countries
like China suggests that the government, in anticipation of lowering
standards of other countries, would seek to anticipatorily lower their
standards. In short, the pressure to maintain supremacy and access in the
industry may incentivize countries to engage in a race to the bottom, where
participating States apply bare minimum regulations at the expense of
environmental or other standards.146
The joint venture structure suggests that smaller countries will have
the same incentives as wealthier countries to engage in such deregulation.
This structure is also a mechanism by which to transform such
deregulation into increased mineral access. Joint ventures in the deep-sea
mining space may take a number of different forms. One method may be
for corporations to engage in profit-sharing agreements with local
governments when the target minerals are in that countrys territorial
waters. Another form, however, may be incorporation in a certain country,
or agreement with a sponsoring State, as the starting point for seeking an
exploratory license from the ISA.
In 2011, Papua New Guinea (PNG) awarded a deep-sea mineral
mining contract to Nautilus Minerals for the extraction of copper and gold

146. Though studies in certain cases claim that regulations have not affected economic
growth and thus did not negatively affect competitive advantage, a portion of these studies
focused on Clean Air Act regulations and not on circumstances comparable to deep-sea
mineral mining licensure programs. See, e.g., CARL A. PASURKA & DEBORAH VAUGHN
NESTOR, THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INDUSTRY: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR
ASSESSMENT (U.S. Envt Prot. Agency 1992), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files
/2017-09/documents/ee-0217a-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7R3-HKRT]. It is more likely in
this case that since regulations directly affect a states ability to remain competitive in the
international space by gaining access to minerals, the likelihood of a regulatory race to the
bottom will also be increased. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and
International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2059 (1993) (describing an
environment where countries lower regulations in an attempt to gain competitive advantage
over others).
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at Solwara 1, a site off the coast of New Ireland.147 The project was
ultimately a failure as the company went into bankruptcy in 2019 after
facing local and international opposition paired with a series of operational
setbacks.148 The PNG government retained a 15% stake in the venture,
which resulted in $24 million of debt after Nautilus failed.149 After the
collapse of the Solwara 1 project, other island nations, including Fiji and
Vanuatu, called for a 10-year moratorium on deep-sea mining efforts.150
Granted, this venture took place in PNGs territorial waters, but this
does not necessarily mean that ventures with similar characteristics will
not take place in the deep ocean. Generally speaking, there exist strong
tax- and regulation-based incentives for corporations to incorporate or
operate out of certain localities or countries.151 The deep-sea mining
industry may become subject to a similar set of incentives.
As will be explained later in detail, the ISA has promulgated rules
governing exploratory license issuance. These rules dictate that signatory
countries must develop their own domestic regulations and licensing
procedures for deep-sea mining. Though many of these regulatory regimes
are similar, it is unclear whether further, more comprehensive regulatory
schemes sought by individual member States will incentivize all States to
enact identical regulations.152 In the absence of uniform domestic
regulations, mining companies will be incentivized to seek licenses in
countries with more relaxed regulations. Additionally, the joint venture
structure incentivizes poorer countries to adopt more relaxed regulatory
regimes to attract joint venture opportunities for mining companies.
For example, if the United States, Germany, or China were to impose
stricter environmental regulation regimes, corporations interested in deepsea mining activities could incorporate in countries that adopt a bare
minimum approach to compliance with ISA requirements. A similar
147. John Childs, Greening the Blue? Corporate Strategies for Legitimizing Deep Sea
Mining, 74 POL. GEOGRAPHY 1, 3 (2019).
148. Amanda Stutt, Nautilus Minerals Officially Sinks, Shares Still Trading, MINING
DOTCOM, (Nov. 26, 2019, 3:38 PM), https://www.mining.com/nautilus-mineralsofficially-sinks-shares-still-trading/ [https://perma.cc/XD95-3XH5].
149. Id. This was an amount the PNG government was unable to recover from Nautilus
Minerals in bankruptcy.
150. Collapse of PNG Deep-Sea Mining Venture Sparks Calls for Moratorium, THE
GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/16/collapse-of-png-deep-seamining-venture-sparks-calls-for-moratorium [https://perma.cc/QE37-U8UL] (last visited
Mar. 21, 2021).
151. See, e.g., Julia Simon, Liberias Flags of Convenience Help it Stay Afloat, NPR
(Nov. 7, 2014, 4:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/11/07/362351967/liberias-flags-ofconvenience-help-it-stay-afloat [https://perma.cc/4QP2-55G4].
152. See, e.g., INTL SEABED AUTH., supra note 124, at 9-18.
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incentive might also exist for domestic tax regimes. Thus, without a
uniform update to domestic deep-sea mining regulation regimes, it is
possible that the industry may adopt norms similar to the cruise ship
industrys flags of convenience.153
Because the licensing process under the ISAs Mining Code involves
sponsorship from a signatory state, the joint venture model may,
unintentionally, be an effective vehicle for promoting an opportunistic
approach to deep-sea mining.154 In order to secure profitable arrangements,
smaller nations may be incentivized to underregulate in order to procure
joint venture agreements with mining companies. This is not to say that
stricter domestic licensing regimes are not necessary. Rather, it suggests
that the international regulatory regime needs to be robust enough to
enforce uniform adherence to UNCLOS standards. And such regulations
need to be more effective than previous United Nations attempts at
affecting land-based mining efforts in the DRC. Relying solely on uniform
updates to domestic regulatory regimes implicitly includes the expectation
that countries will overlook self-interest. Such evidence supports the
contention that a robust mechanism for international enforcement is
necessary to override these incentives.
III. MULTILATERAL PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS: CHARACTERISTICS OF
DEEP-SEA MINERAL MINING AND WHY IT REQUIRES AN
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIME
As previously discussed, differences in domestic regulatory regimes
create the risk of regulatory arbitrage and a race to the bottom. One
mechanism for avoiding such risk is multilateral agreements. At times,
these agreements suffer from enforceability issues, where collaboration
between nations may occur at the outset, but the ultimate regulatory aims
do not have the intended effects on the target industry.
This section analyzes various theories explaining the genesis stories
surrounding international agreements and how certain types of agreements
endure. Further, this section explores the manner in which international
agreements interact with one another in order to obtain enforceability
across seemingly unrelated regulatory efforts. Regardless of the manner in
which, or the reasons for which, countries enter into agreements,
enforceability of those agreements should be the measure of efficacy.
Though some current structures might provide a blueprint from which
deep-sea mineral mining regulations may be modeled, it is unknown
153. Simon, supra note 151.
154. See INTL SEABED AUTH., supra note 124, at 13.
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whether future individual national interest may override those
enforcement mechanisms. More specifically, whereas international trade
agreements provide enforcement mechanisms to deter unwanted behavior,
it is unclear whether a similarly structured deep-sea mineral mining regime
will serve as an effective deterrent.
A. Current International Structures Regulating Deep-Sea Mineral
Mining
1. The United Nations and The International Seabed Authority
On December 10, 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) was opened for signature.155 This agreement placed
fifty percent of the worlds seabed under international jurisdiction in order
to protect interests of geographically disadvantaged States, and small
island developing States that are heavily reliant on the ocean and its
resources for economic development.156 The Convention declared in its
preamble that the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof . . . as well as its
resources, are the common heritage of mankind, the exploration and
exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a
whole.157 Starting with Article 136, Section 2, UNCLOS sets forth
requirements for deep-sea mineral mining exploration and the
responsibilities of signatories.158 Among these imperatives is Article 145,
which states that necessary measures shall be taken . . . to ensure
effective protection for the marine environment from harmful effects
which may arise from deep-sea mineral mining.159
In addition to establishing principles and preliminary limits on deepsea mining, UNCLOS also established the International Seabed Authority
(ISA), the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS),
and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).160 The ISA
155. UNCLOS, supra note 10.
156. Michael Lodge, The International Seabed Authority and Deep Seabed Mining, UN
CHRONICLE https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/international-seabed-authority-anddeep-seabed-mining [https://perma.cc/2BUN-CVM4] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
157. UNCLOS, supra note 10, at 25.
158. Id. at 70.
159. Id. at 73.
160. Lodge, supra note 156. Though these structures are the official organizations vested
with the authority to enact regulations concerning the Area, dynamics in international law
do not make these institutions immune from the actions of outside actors. See, e.g., Julia
Conley, Momentous Moratorium on Deep-Sea Mining Adopted at Global Biodiversity
Summit, ECOWATCH (Sept. 11, 2021) https://www.ecowatch.com/deep-sea-miningmoratorium-2654975897.html [https://perma.cc/N86L-9VUN]. Such collective action
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is primarily responsible for regulating exploration for and exploitation of
deep seabed minerals.161 As of 2017, the ISA had issued twenty-nine
exploration contracts covering more than 1.3 million square kilometers of
ocean floor.162 Today, the number of contracts is thirty.163 Although the
ISA has established a regulatory framework for exploration, the complete
mining code has yet to be codified.164
In its draft environmental regulation, the ISA requires applicants,
among other things, to provide an environmental impact statement.165
After an application is completed and submitted, the environmental plans
are posted to the ISAs website for sixty days to allow signatories and other
stakeholders to submit comments.166 The ISA directs that the
environmental impact statement a party submits as part of an application
must include an impact analysis to describe and predict the nature and
extent of the Environmental Effects of the mining operation.167
UNCLOSs broad declarations, supported by signatories, may face an
uncertain future without uniform adherence to those standards by all
countries engaged in mining. For example, although 157 nations were
signatories to UNCLOS, the United States is conspicuously absent.168
Thus, the United States is not a party to many of the agreements or
outside the walls of the United Nations may be sufficient in some cases to affect policy
decision-making. W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of
International Law, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
114TH ANNUAL MEETING 118, 122 (1992) (In international decision, the observer must
examine, in addition to formal international organization, state officials, nongovernmental
organizations, pressure groups, interest groups, gangs, and individuals, who act on behalf
of all other participants and on their own.). Thus, collective decisions with symbolic
appearance, as seems to be the case with the Global Biodiversity Summit, may indeed
influence policy decisions at the International Seabed Authority and the United Nations
generally.
161. Lodge, supra note 156.
162. Id.
163. Exploration Contracts, INTL SEABED AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/index.php/ex
ploration-contracts [https://perma.cc/4SHD-KXB8] (last visited Sept. 29, 2021).
164. The Mining Code, INTL SEABEAD AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code
[https://perma.cc/2Z2K-LBJ6 ] (last visited Sept. 29, 2021).
165. INTL SEABED AUTH., DRAFT REGULATIONS ON EXPLOITATION OF MINERAL
RESOURCES IN THE AREA 14 (Mar. 22, 2019) https://isa.org.jm/files/files
/documents/isba_25_c_wp1-e_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6GY-EEN2].
166. Id. at 16.
167. Id. at 37.
168. Will Schrepferman, Hypocri-sea: The United States Failure to Join the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, HARV. INTL REV., (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://hir.harvard.edu/hypocri-sea-the-united-states-failure-to-join-the-un-conventionon-the-law-of-the-sea-2/ [https://perma.cc/U4NL-SQ6Z].
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regulations concerning the deep ocean or deep-sea mineral mining under
the ISA. The U.S. Constitution allows the President to enter into
international agreements and treaties with the approval of two-thirds of the
Senate.169 The prospect of joining the Convention was first raised during
President Clintons administration, but the Senate has never ratified U.S.
involvement in any such agreement.170 Reasons for failure to ratify may
vary, but the lack of U.S. involvement may signal an uncertain future for
the enforceability of international standards for deep-sea mining in the
future. Ultimately, U.S. domestic law concerning mineral mining reflects
many of the values espoused by UNCLOS, but lack of commitment to the
agreement raises questions of enforceability.
2. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) is an
independent judicial body vested with the authority to adjudicate disputes
that involve interpreting the Convention.171 Within ITLOS, the Seabed
Disputes Chamber, typically consisting of eleven judges, has the authority
to adjudicate disputes relating to deep-sea mining activities.172 ITLOS also
has the authority to issue advisory opinions.173
One such advisory opinion in 2011 concerned the responsibilities and
obligations of states sponsoring persons and entities with respect to
activities in the area.174 Much of the Tribunals explanation of the
Conventions language puts responsibility on member states for
environmental assessments and environmental monitoring of the effects of
mining activities.175 The Tribunal stated that the sponsoring State is under
a due diligence obligation to ensure compliance by the sponsored
contractor with this obligation.176 Outside of the responsibilities outlined
in UNCLOS, the Tribunal also explained that it is now generally
considered a requirement in customary international law that organizations
169. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
170. 60 MINUTES, supra note 9.
171. Competence, Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, ITLOS, https://www.itlos.org/en/main/
jurisdiction/competence/ [https://perma.cc/5ASE-N8YX] (last visited Sept. 30, 2021).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. ITLOS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF STATES SPONSORING PERSONS AND
ENTITIES WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA (Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011),
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/17_adv_op_010211_e
n.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBG2-9XWK] [hereinafter ITLOS Advisory Opinion of Feb 1,
2011].
175. Id. at 43-46.
176. Id. at 43.
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undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that
the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a
transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource.177 Ultimately,
the Tribunal expanded State responsibilities explaining that the
obligations of the contractors and of the sponsoring State concerning
environmental impact assessments extend beyond the scope of application
of specific provisions of the Regulations.178
A fundamental feature of the Seabed Disputes Chamber is flexibility.
Depending on the nature of the controversy, disputants can choose a thirdparty forum for adjudication.179 If a case concerns the interpretation of a
mining contract, parties can submit the dispute to an ad hoc three-member
panel for commercial arbitration.180 If a dispute relates to production
subsidization, parties may submit to arbitration under the WTO dispute
settlement process.181
Seabed Dispute Chamber orders face difficulty in enforcement,
however. One of the primary vehicles to enforce a judgment involves
attaching property. Because the Seabed disputes chamber is not a
constitutional court and because the Convention allows for State immunity
from liability, ITLOS orders may be unenforceable in national courts.182 If
ITLOS decisions do not have their own compelling enforcement
mechanisms independent of actions by individual States, the United
Nations, through the ISA, might necessarily be required to call on member
States to assist. Yet individual States would be unable, through their own
domestic regulatory regimes, to achieve desirable outcomes, as was
observed in the United States attempt to influence domestic mining
conditions in the DRC.
In all, ITLOS is a new international adjudicatory body that operates
across a number of different regimes with a seemingly broader charter than
other international courts.183 Specifically relating to the Seabed Disputes
Chamber, enforceability of decisions remains an outstanding question. As
this comment later argues, the flexible nature of ITLOS should be
leveraged to fill the enforceability gap by utilizing already existing
precedent within the ITLOS and WTO dispute settlement structures to
create a trade-related remedy for deep-sea mineral mining cases.
177. Id. at 45 (citing I.C.J. in its judgment in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay. Id.).
178. Id. at 46.
179. John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CORNELL
INTL L J. 109, 138 (1999).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 138-39.
182. Id. at 171.
183. Id. at 140.
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This mechanism is different from subsidy adjudication at the WTO
because deep-sea mineral mining subject matter would be most
appropriately adjudicated within the Seabed Disputes Chamber. As will be
later discussed, the inclusion of non-trade related subject matter within the
WTO process is not novel. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was brought under the auspices of
the WTO in 1994, in part to take advantage of the great enforcement power
inherent to international trade tribunals.184 A similar approach may be
possible for deep-sea mineral mining.
B. The Transnational Legal Process and Deep-Sea Mineral Mining
Generally, most countries observe principles of international law and
agreements most of the time.185 One theory for why international
agreements can be binding is based on national interest and identity.186
Harold Koh, one of the leading experts in public and private international
law in the United States, argues that this binding force is more readily
explained by (1) the interaction between nations; and (2) domestic
internalization of international norms.187 In part, violating international
norms creates friction between countries, making future participation in
international agreements more difficult.188 Thus, country leaders may shift
non-compliant behaviors to ones of compliance in order to avoid such
friction.189 These shifts are then codified in domestic law, this being an
internalization of international law that permeates domestic legal and
political structures through legislation, executive action, and judicial
decisions.190 Finally, international norms become enmeshed in domestic
policy decision-making through this process.191
Kohs theory accounts for rogue states who invariably will have to
participate in the international community. Through these same
mechanisms, such states will be drawn into general compliance with

184. Allison Cychosz, The Effectiveness of International Enforcement of Intellectual
Property, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 985, 992-93 (2004).
185. Harold H. Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 194 (1994).
186. Id. at 199.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 203.
189. Id. at 204.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Robert O. Keohane, Compliance with International Commitments:
Politics Within a Framework of Law, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 114TH ANNUAL MEETING 176, 176-180 (1992)).
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international norms.192 Ultimately, the theory of the transnational legal
process predicts that nations will come into compliance with international
norms as a result of interactions with other nations.193
Kohs theory puts a gloss on the mechanisms that push nations back
into compliance with international norms, however. Though scholars
disagree about the efficacy of the dispute resolution process at the WTO,
some data suggests that countries largely comply with WTO decisions.194
WTO member States largely remain in compliance with trade agreements
whether it be the result of settlement negotiations or adherence to adverse
WTO decisions.195
One example of specific mechanisms at play involved the
extraterritorial kidnapping of Humberto Alvarez-Machain by the United
States.196 The Supreme Court held that the abduction was justified because
it was not in violation of the extradition agreement between the United
States and Mexico, but this was not the final word on the matter.197 The
abduction earned much criticism from the media and the international
community, ultimately leading to congressional hearings, and a review of
Department of Justice policy on transborder kidnappings.198 Under the
192. Id. at 205.
193. Id. at 206. Environmental compliance procedures under the ISA Mining Code
adhere, in part, to the transnational legal process principles mentioned in Kohs article. The
opportunity for signatory nations to provide feedback on environmental impact
assessments might provide an opportunity to bring potentially non-compliant nations back
into compliance during the licensing issuing process. What this process does not address,
however, is licensee actions after a license is issued, which are not necessarily governed
by the same mechanism.
194. William J. Davy, Compliance Problems in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 CORNELL
INTL L.J. 119, 119 (2009) ([a] recent examination of the implementation record of WTO
decisions for the first ten years of WTO dispute settlement found a compliance rate of
83%). But see Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defiance: The WTO
Compliance Scorecard, 18 J. INTELL. PROP L. 401, 403 (2011) ([s]ome commentators
extol the success of the WTO dispute system in securing an excellent compliance record
in adjudicated decisions, particularly when compared to the prior GATT system [while
others], however, believe the WTO system is deeply flawed or ineffective for any number
of reasons.) (internal citations omitted).
195. Debra P. Steger & Susan M. Hainsworth, The First Three Years, 1 J. INTL ECON.
L. 199, 204 (1998) (One of the most desirable developments since the establishment of
the WTO has been the increased propensity of parties to reach mutually agreed solutions
to disputes. The binding nature of decisions, the short timeframes, the automaticity of the
steps in the process and the strengthened mechanisms for surveillance and enforcement of
rulings all contribute to the mutually acceptable resolution of disputes.).
196. Koh, supra note 185, at 195-96. This case came to the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
197. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992).
198. Koh, supra note 185, at 195-96.
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pressure of North American Free Trade negotiations, Secretary of State
Warren Christopher announced an amendment to the U.S.-Mexico
extradition agreement that would ban transborder kidnappings.199
Ultimately, the positive incentives associated with a liberalized trade
agreement between two countries incentivized a return to compliance with
international norms.
Another example involved the extraterritorial return of refugees from
Haiti and Cuba.200 In 1992, the United States, in violation of Article 33 of
the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, began returning refugees found on the high seas.201 The
Supreme Court upheld the executive action, but again this was not the final
word.202 In 1994, after receiving pressure from the United Nations, various
human rights groups, and the Congressional Black Caucus, President
Clinton reversed this policy.203 This time, a return to compliance was not
achieved through trade related mechanisms, but through domestic interests
in complying with international human rights norms.
Another theory suggests that states will act in their own interest and
that compliance with international norms is a result of either coincidence
of interest, coercion, cooperation, or coordination.204 Goldsmith and
Posners theory of cooperation and the multilateral prisoners dilemma is
particularly apropos to deep-sea mineral mining.205 In a multilateral
setting, efficacy of, and compliance with, a norm relies on each States
ability and willingness to punish those who violate the terms of a treaty in
addition to punishing States who fail to punish those violating States.206
Compliance can be systematized by establishing international institutions
or multilateral treaties, which increase transparency of international
relations, ultimately making it easier to identify and punish cheaters.207
Goldsmith and Posners suggestion that States will act in their own
interest and that such action, if it results in a multilateral agreement, is the
result of a coincidence of interests may explain, in part, some of the
199. Id. at 196.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 196-97.
202. Id. at 197.
203. Id. at 197-98.
204. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2732 (2005).
205. Id. at 29, 87.
206. Id. at 87. Goldsmith and Posner explain that WTO efficacy is largely attributable to
the fact that States are willing to retaliate against non-compliance if other States violate
their obligations. Id. at 162.
207. Id. at 86.
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dynamics at play during the signing of UNCLOS. The 1985 Helsinki
Protocol serves as a comparable example of some of these forces.208 This
agreement was intended to reduce instances of acid rain by addressing
sulfur dioxide emissions.209 Though signatories met emission reduction
goals in the specified time, it is possible that this agreement only codified
what countries had already planned to do.210 As evidence of this, the
behavior of non-signatory States also matched that of signatory States.211
Put simply, the Helsinki Protocol may not have compelled any changes in
behavior, but rather the agreement may have only codified emissions
reduction goals that were policy targets already included in domestic
policy regimes. Similarly, it is possible that States agreed to UNCLOSs
provisions out of a coincidence of interests, but that no State did so at
either the sacrifice or benefit of their own interests as deep-sea mineral
mining had still yet to occur.
As discussed in section IV(A) regarding domestic policy regimes, and
in light of legislative action prior to the passage of UNCLOS, it is possible
that the Convention may have simply codified an already existing
sentiment in many States. The Helsinki Protocol is further applicable to
UNCLOS, because domestic legislative action was initiated by the United
States, a non-signatory to the Convention. Thus, a possible explanation for
UNCLOS is that the agreement captured the assent of many nations who
were already so inclined, thus making a public display of their virtue. It
could be interpreted as an international agreement that levied no cost on
signatories. Future commercialization may adjust that calculus.
With regard to international environmental treaties, another theory
identifies five requirements, all of which must be met, in order for the
treaty to succeed.212 First, treaties need to create an aggregate gain that
provides a reason for states to begin negotiations and ultimately become
parties to the agreement.213 Second, the gains of the agreement have to be
distributed between states so that each state shares in the success of the
agreement.214 Third, the treaty must ensure countries would lose by not
participating.215 Fourth, the treaty must provide incentives for all parties to

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See id. at 8-10.
See id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 33 (2003).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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comply with the treaty.216 And fifth, the treaty must deter entry by third
parties.217 Though UNCLOS and the ISA arguably satisfy the first three
conditions, a future multilateral agreement may be necessary to ensure
States are properly incentivized to comply with the treaty and that third
parties are deterred from entering into deep-sea mining activities.
As already discussed, the Conventions regulations as applied to deepsea mineral mining have not yet been tested by changes in incentives
associated with commercialization. Treaties concerning agreements on
regulation of common goods and environmental protections can serve to
reframe state interests, however.218 This initial agreement, and shift in
perception, provides a foundation to begin the iterative process of creating
international norms.219
UNCLOS and the ISAs Mining Code may have been the first steps in
codifying existing sentiment with regard to regulating deep-sea mineral
mining, but they ought not be the final word. Rather, they represent a first
step in the evolutionary process of deep-sea mineral mining regulation.
The next step necessarily needs to include mechanisms by which to
incentivize, or compel, membership to the agreement and adherence to
international standards for mining.
C. Possible Mechanisms for Enforcing ITLOS Orders
UNCLOS signatory States are currently engaged in a multilateral
prisoners dilemma, except the unknown variables are the values
associated with non-compliance. Though States will enter into agreements
because on balance they will gain more than they will lose, changes in, or
creation of, new international norms is the product of changes in payoffs
that create a conflict of interests.220 More specifically, States will violate
treaties if their interests are strong enough to outweigh their sense of
obligation.221
The future expected change in payoffs will likely be associated with
commercialization of deep-sea mineral mining. Once economically viable,
State, and corporate, payoffs associated with compliance may adjust. If
such an adjustment occurs in the absence of an effective system to punish
non-compliance, it is possible that UNCLOS and ISA principles will
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 17-18.
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 204, at 41.
Id. at 83.
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morph into a new set of international norms redrawn by signatory States
to suit the changed conditions.222 The absence of a robust regime for
enforcing ITLOS orders only adds to these concerns.223
International norms can be enforced in the absence of multilateral
treaties and official structures, but such an absence leaves open the
possibility of piecemeal application of regulations. The most prevalent
examples of this phenomenon evince a collision of national interests rather
than actions by individual states seeking to compel others to adhere to
norms for effective management of natural resources in the commons. For
example, internationally unpopular military action taken by one country
may result in trade barriers and other sanctions as an attempt to force
course correction.224 Applied to deep-sea mineral mining, this type of
enforcement would require one States actions to so diametrically oppose
anothers that the other State would be willing to retaliate. The attenuated
nature of mineral access creating adverse consequences for another State
does not appear to provide a solid footing upon which to construct an
international regulatory regime. Thus, relying on unstructured
international retaliation to unilateral state action will likely be insufficient
for the purposes of enforcing deep-sea mineral mining interests. Put
simply, non-compliant behavior by one state may not generate significant
enough of an incentive for another state to raise trade barriers or impose
sanctions unilaterally, and relying on such action may lead to a lack of
uniformity in regulatory enforcement.
222. See id. On the other hand, Goldsmith and Posner do suggest that when States
legislatures adopt international treaties as law, they may be increasing the likelihood of
compliance with the terms of the treaty. Id. at 92-93. As discussed in the section regarding
national legislation relating to deep-sea mineral mining, many states, including the U.S.,
have adopted similar legislation, which signals some degree of resolve in complying with
UNCLOS and ISA norms, but again, those norms have not yet been tested under what
appear to be inevitable changes in circumstances.
223. JULIA BROWER, ET AL., UNCLOS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN CONTEXT: THE UNITED
STATES RECORD IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS 6-7 (Dec. 10, 2012)
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/cglc/yale_law_school_-_unclos_
and_arbitration.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8X6-RRKU] (signatory states must undertake a
good faith obligation . . . to comply with a decision.).
224. This was the case when Russian military action against Ukraine resulted in U.S.
sanctions. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10779, U.S. SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA: AN OVERVIEW
(2020). This has also been the United States general approach to compel countries like
Cuba and North Korea to comply with international norms. See Eleanor Albert, What to
Know About Sanctions on North Korea, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 16, 2019)
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea
[https://perma.cc/Q7M5-YYDF].
Such action by the U.S. is more an attempt to balance power regionally as opposed to
protect the integrity of international agreements on the management of natural resources.
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Enforceability of ITLOS judgments may become tenuous if there is
not substantially a greater incentive for compliance over non-compliance.
The ISA and ITLOS may have to venture outside the four walls of
UNCLOS in order to create incentives that make compliance the most
attractive solutions for individual countries. Different from the general
manner in which countries interact with each other and seek to compel
compliance on an ad hoc basis, regulation of the deep ocean would best be
served if systematized and directly related to international trade.225
To date, ITLOS has rendered decisions in contentious cases relating
primarily to territorial waters and vessel disputes.226 Cases regarding deepsea mineral mining have been the providence of advisory opinions where
signatory States have asked the Tribunal to interpret the Convention.227
Thus, the enforceability of ITLOS orders in contentious cases regarding
deep-sea mineral mining rights or proper use of exploratory licenses in
general has not yet been tested. Without such an example, it is difficult to
know whether signatories would be inclined to comply with adverse
ITLOS judgments should they be issued. An argument based on the
transnational legal process may show that non-complying countries will
be brought back into compliance through their interaction with other
countries, but this still leaves open the question: through what specific
mechanism will this be achieved?228
225. Deep-sea mineral mining as an activity supports extraction of materials used in
products that enter the international market. This activity does not exist in a silo. The
ultimate benefit a corporation, and the sponsoring state, realize is the value addition and
sale of goods produced as a result of mineral extraction. Thus, an effective mechanism for
compelling compliance could relate directly to either reducing or expanding the end-use
benefit associated with the activity.
226. Contentious Cases, ITLOS, https://www.itlos.org/en/main/cases/contentious-cases/
[https://perma.cc/9HWD-VDGF] (last visited Feb. 6, 2021).
227. ITLOS Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, supra note 174.
228. The PNG mining case shows that mobilization of similarly-minded groups against
deep-sea mining efforts may be more robust than expected, although this may not
necessarily be the case going forward. In that specific instance, opposition was certainly
organized against Nautilus Minerals Ltd., but the company and the venture would likely
not have been commercially viable even in the absence of opposition. See Colin Filer, et
al., How PNG lost US$120 million and the future of deep-sea mining, DEVPOLICY BLOG
(April 28, 2020), https://devpolicy.org/how-png-lost-us120-million-and-the-future-ofdeep-sea-mining-20200428/ [https://perma.cc/3KWX-8A24]. The PNG government made
a substantial investment in the company and, when Nautilus Minerals declared bankruptcy,
lost nearly $120 million. Nautiluss early investment in pioneering the first major
commercial operation faced difficulties aside from environmental and community
opposition. If future projects are able to effectively address issues of commercial viability
(i.e., effective equipment, lower operating costs, etc.), the reduction of barriers in general
may make organized opposition less effective in general. In short, the organized opposition
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As previously mentioned, sponsoring States have the obligation to
assist the ISA in ensuring mining organizations comply with
environmental best practices.229 One concern could be that a country,
through one of its corporations, engaging in mining operations may
experience significant economic gains if they are able to skirt their original
promises as they relate to environmental compliance or the geographical
boundaries of a mining license.230 A solution completely internal to the
ISA may be an insufficient deterrence to avert non-compliance. Other
mechanisms, like sanctions from other countries or trade retaliation, might
more readily deter such action.
In a hypothetical example of such a systematized mechanism, a
country extracting cobalt and nickel from the ocean floor, might
experience greater economic gain if they disregard their environmental
responsibilities by releasing sediment plumes in excess of their approved
impact assessment or by conducting operations outside the boundaries of
their license. Any state could be authorized to bring a complaint claiming
injury for such action. If the claim is successful, ITLOS could issue an
adverse judgement that would be redeemable at the WTO. The WTO could
then authorize retaliation in the form of tariff increases on the violating
country. Such increases would relate to products produced with the mined
minerals, or any benefit accrued depending on what portion of the value
the country is operating in, and would offset the gain the violating country
would have realized by noncompliance. Such a mechanism would reduce
the potential gain that country would experience by violating their original
agreement and would draw them back into compliance. In short, noncompliance would result in no net gain for a country.

to the Nautilus Minerals project in PNG may have been slightly overstated in its efficacy
since many other issues existed with the project and it may have been doomed to fail even
in the absence of any opposition from interest groups. Additionally, organization against
the Solwara 1 project occurred on an ad hoc basis, which supports Harold Kohs theory of
countries being brought back into compliance, but it does not provide an enduring
mechanism for future issues that may occur with deep-sea mining projects. Put differently,
effective opposition by advocacy groups in one setting does not mean that advocacy will
be the solution in all settings. Relying solely on this structure and not a more systematized
mechanism of known incentives actionable by national governments does not provide an
enduring framework for assuring future compliance with environmental or geographical
boundaries infractions of exploratory license holders.
229. ITLOS Advisory Opinion of Feb 1, 2011, supra note 174, at 44.
230. Domestic regulations that make such a concern prevalent primarily come from
domestic regulations in countries like Russia where environmental constraints are vague
and mining companies are promised the protection of the Russian government. INTL
SEABED AUTH., supra note 124, at 15.
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This comment suggests three ways to approach such a solution: (1)
creation of a new international agreement granting ITLOS the authority to
adjudicate the mining claims, naming the WTO as the appropriate venue
for redeeming the judgment; (2) an international agreement under the
WTO structure granting partial or cooperative adjudicative authority to
ITLOS; or (3) an international agreement placed entirely under the WTO
structure that focuses exclusively on deep-sea mineral mining remedies.
As previously discussed, deep-sea mineral mining disputes involving
subsidization claims can be brought to the WTO. This existing precedent
is helpful in paving a partial path to ITLOS enforceability, but the
cooperative solution suggested by the first two options above raises
questions of comity between international tribunals, which may raise more
questions than it answers. The more fitting and likely more actionable
structure would look similar to TRIPS. The World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) is the primary structure under the United Nations
dealing with intellectual property and it provides a venue for settlement
negotiations and mediation.231 However, because it lacks effective
enforcement power, the WIPO recommends that IP holders seek remedies
through remedies outside the WIPO structure.232 TRIPS was a separate
agreement brought under the WTO in 1994 to solve this problem. TRIPS
is the only international agreement regarding intellectual property that
includes a comprehensive section dedicated to enforcement.233 Ultimately,
TRIPS provides a venue for intellectual property owners to bring a
complaint and receive a remedy through the WTO adjudicatory process.234
A comparable approach may solve the enforceability issues with ITLOS.
Under such a structure, signatories, and non-signatories like the
United States, would be empowered to enter into a treaty outside of the
UNCLOS structure specifying norms for adjudication and retaliation,
vesting adjudicatory power in the WTO. In any specific instance, this
process may necessarily need to include a determination by the Seabed
Disputes Chamber that a defendant violated the terms of UNCLOS, but
final adjudication and the award of a remedy would be the providence of
the WTO dispute settlement process. The WTO would engage in specific

231. Settling Disputes and Enforcing IP Rights, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/settle_ip_disputes/ [https://perma.cc/E2CX-DJPV] (last
visited Nov. 14, 2021).
232. Id.
233. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ipenforcement_e.htm [https://perma.cc/4Z
VS-BG3V] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
234. Id.
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fact finding to determine the degree to which trade barriers could offset
the gains a State realized by violating the terms of a mining license.
In short, the next evolutionary step for regulating deep-sea mineral
mining must necessarily include an actionable mechanism to compel
compliance with UNCLOS and ISA norms. Because the current structure
does not grant ITLOS or the ISA the ability to punish non-compliance
beyond license revocation, a new mechanism for enforcement must
venture outside the traditional structure. Trade related remedies have
experienced great success with compliance historically, and the precedent
set by the existence of TRIPS provides a promising blueprint for what
deep-sea mineral mining enforcement might look like in the future.
CONCLUSION
Domestic regulatory regimes and courts are ill-equipped to provide
uniform enforcement of international norms, full redressability of injuries,
or effective deterrence for violations of international norms. First, our
experience with mineral mining, notably in the DRC, shows the limits of
domestic regulation. Whether these regulations originated in the DRC or
were regulatory responses by other countries answering the United
Nations call for assistance, the ultimate goals of these measures were not
met. In fact, domestic regulatory regimes like the Dodd-Frank Act may
have served to increase black market mining activity. The noticeable gap
in the DRC example is effective enforcement of international norms by
international organizations.
Though a potential solution would be absolute uniformity in domestic
regulatory regimes, a much more actionable mechanism would be to create
an enforceable international standard. Even in the presence of national
regulatory uniformity, systematized international mechanisms for
regulation enforcement will be necessary.
Second, with the United States as an example, redressability of harm
created by future mineral mining activities may be severely limited to a
level below that of the harm caused. This example shows that the
traditional liability structure for maritime activities in Admiralty may be
insufficient in order to offset harm created by mining operations. Increases
in liability standards, done in a manner similarly to the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, might mitigate this concern.
Third, deep-sea mineral mining regimes require a robust, enforceable
multilateral structure in order to account for foreseeable future dynamics.
Both signatories and non-signatories seem to embrace UNCLOSs guiding
principles, but adherence to this lofty ideal has yet to be tested under future
changes associated with large-scale commercialization. Once deep-sea
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mineral mining becomes economical, both corporate entities and
sponsoring states will be highly incentivized to breach the ISAs Mining
Code and UNCLOSs principles in order to maximize their own interests.
In the absence of an effective mechanism to draw these actors back into
compliance, such activities will continue, be it through disregard of
environmental concerns or mining boundaries.
Currently, environmental concerns are largely hypothetical since
studies do not conclusively prove the negative impacts mining activities
will have. Nonetheless, implementing incentive programs and retaliatory
measures is still possible in the absence of certainty. Put simply, we do not
need to wait to discover the negative impacts of deep-sea mineral mining
before establishing an effective system of enforcement.
Lastly, the absence of a strong system of enforcement does not mean
that the originally negotiated terms of UNCLOS are a failure. Rather, the
Convention and subsequent Mining Code ratified by the ISA are necessary
steps in an evolutionary process inherent to international agreements. The
next necessary step is to ensure a strong system of compliance so that all
actors are incentivized to abide by international norms and to enforce such
compliance in other States.
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